

22 October 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
 FROM : Andrew T. Falkiewicz  
 Assistant to the Director  
 SUBJECT : Contacts with the Press

Listed below is a summary of inquiries from the press reported by Agency personnel for 21 October.

<u>Media Representative</u>	<u>Agency Contact</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Henry Dormann publisher of new magazine, <i>Chief Executive</i>	Mr. Falkiewicz	Visited here. Would like article by DCI. We agreed to consider this after magazine is published (Spring 1977).
Eugene Patterson <i>St. Petersburg Times</i>	Mr. Falkiewicz	Said that he is drafting a resolution for the ASNE meeting at Honolulu on 16 Nov. The resolution will deal with CIA relations with journalists. He wanted to know if all relations have been terminated, as specified in 11 Feb. statement. We said we are still in the "as soon as feasible" time framework which we indicated would reasonably extend at least to the end of the year. His second query was to verify that foreign journalists not working for any American organization were <u>not</u> included in the 11 Feb. statement; we confirmed. He said that

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Eugene Patterson  
*St. Petersburg Times*

the thrust of a possible resolution would be to urge the US to show good example of respect for free press by voluntarily giving up intelligence use of any journalist anywhere in the world.

David Binder  
John Crewdson  
*New York Times*

Mr. Falkiewicz

Asked about United Fruit story. We said it old hat.

Tony Marro  
*Newsweek*

Mr. Falkiewicz

Asked if Orlando Bosch had any contact with Chileans. We cannot help.

STATINTL



Andrew T. Falkiewicz

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*BEST COPY*  
*Available*  
*THROUGHOUT*  
*FOLDER*

6/24/98

## Viewpoints

# Playing Politics With the Mayaguez

By Gregory G. Rushford

The White House response to the recent report on the Mayaguez affair demonstrates an old political truism: To avoid answering criticism throw up a smoke-screen by attacking your critic's motives. The press will be distracted by the sensational aspects of partisan strife; scarcely anyone will address the issue on its merits; soon the episode will recede from memory. It's surprising how well this tactic works in supposedly sophisticated times.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sniffed that the report, prepared for a congressional subcommittee by the General Accounting Office, was based on "inadequate materials," and told reporters "I was there, and I know what information the government was working from."

During the second TV debate with Jimmy Carter, President Ford avoided admitting that the White House had tried to block the report's release. Instead he complained of its authorship by a "grandstand quarterback" who had "interjected partisan politics" into an issue of national security by releasing the report just before the debate. Editorial writers generally sided with the President, and as the White House had anticipated, the report's merits were lost in the shuffle.

Here is the background for readers who want to judge for themselves who was playing partisan politics to the country's detriment.

In May, 1975, when the Cambodians seized the Mayaguez, the United States was smarting over South Vietnam's ignominious collapse. An outrageous act of piracy called for strong military moves and the administration took them, to its credit. The errors made should be judged in this context.

Shortly after the incident, Rep. Dante B. Fascell (D-Fla.) chaired a House International Relations subcommittee to investigate. His hearings were frustrated because the administration sent relatively low-level officials who were not fully informed on the decision-making process. Lacking adequate staff himself, Fascell then asked the GAO to probe more deeply into the crisis. It was a reasonable request, and post-mortems often provide insights on how to improve performance in the future. And the operation's efficiency was certainly open to question (to save the 40 lives of the Mayaguez crew 41 rescuers lost their lives).

The trouble was, Kissinger would not cooperate. In July, 1975, the GAO asked the National Security Council for documents necessary to the inquiry. More than five weeks elapsed before the NSC's secretary informed the GAO that "we have already provided a great deal of information to Congress to which the GAO was welcome. Since the information submitted

to Congress had been so inadequate as to spark a fuller investigation, the secretary's response drew the battle lines. Throughout 1975 the investigators engaged in a persistent struggle for access to information. They were denied access to considerable data, thus allowing Kissinger to scorn their efforts as incomplete.

By early 1976 the GAO was ready to publish its findings. It had not been permitted to see evidence of serious deficiencies in U.S. intelligence agencies which the CIA and its military intelligence counterparts were well aware of. Even without that information, however, the record was indeed flawed.

Although U.S. intelligence learned the Cambodians had seized a Panamanian ship several days before the Mayaguez seizure, and had fired upon a South Korean ship before that, the information was not disseminated properly in the government. Nor was it passed on to our ships near Cambodian coastal waters. A bureaucratic "misunderstanding" delayed distribution of the initial intelligence warning; it was received by State Department intelligence but not immediately shared with the department's operational side. In the low-key words of the report, some "important details on the possible location of the crew did not reach decisionmakers," which helps explain why Washington did not know where the crew was—the central question.

On the other hand, the GAO also handed its share of praise: Our initial military efforts did help to get the crew back, even though the Marines landed after the crew had been released; "command and control" of military communications was effective. The report also commented on the "valor and prowess" of American servicemen.

The most stinging criticism of an otherwise mild report was its questioning of the effectiveness of diplomatic initiatives to release the crew. The investigators found that the Cambodians might have been prepared to accept a political solution because of the initial U.S. show of force. Not taken into account, the GAO said, was "a report received more than 14 hours

CONTINUED

before the Marine assault was initiated and which indicated that a foreign government was using its influence with Cambodia to seek an early release of the Mayaguez and expected it to be released soon." Furthermore, the administration did not attempt "several possibilities for communication with the new Cambodian government."

These findings were to be released last May (before the Republican convention in August, when nobody contemplated a presidential debate). In March the Defense Department expressed no opposition on national security grounds to publication of the report. But the report remained "secret" at the insistence of the White House staff.

Lawrence S. Eagleburger, an able, tough Kissinger aide who has been described as "Henry's Haldeman and Colson rolled into one," wrote the GAO in March, calling the congressional investigators "amateurs." The GAO staff, he said, had gone "out of their way to develop wholly fictional diplomatic scenarios which bore no resemblance to the fact or reality, and then criticized the administration for its 'failure' to pursue their fantasies." This established the groundwork for the effort to discredit the investigators instead of answering the criticism on the merits.

During his second TV debate President Ford asserted that the White House had given permission to release the report on July 12. Actually, the White House merely submitted on that day a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis of which parts of the report it sanctioned for publication and which it didn't. Negotiations between the White House and the committee continued until mid-September. When the committee finally accepted White House conditions, it took a few more weeks for editing and printing before publication, which happened to coincide with the second debate. It can be argued that, had the report been released in July, the committee would have been accused of interfering with Ford's nomination struggle with Ronald Reagan.

Where had I heard all this before?

While the GAO investigated Mayaguez, the House Intelligence Committee, which I served as a staff aide, was discovering similar—but by far more serious—breakdowns of U.S. intelligence at critical junctures. The CIA and its counterparts bungled warnings of the 1973 Middle East War, the 1974 Cyprus and Portuguese coups, the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam and other cases.

Kissinger denied us access to information. Eagleburger was sent to denounce the effort. The administration pressured Congress to kill the report, and denied the parts which were leaked to the press. Lost in the squabble were the investigative findings, and the press focused on political strife. There has been no substantial reform in the U.S. intelligence agencies. The episode recedes from memory.

Isn't it interesting how the same thing happened to Fzscell?

*Gregory G. Rushford was an investigator for the House Select Committee on Intelligence during its recent investigation of the CIA.*

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: <i>DCI A/DCI</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS: Executive Registry <i>76-5501</i>		
<p><i>① ATF: What are your impressions of Downing?</i></p> <p><i>② [Redacted] Please Discuss</i></p> <p><i>coll</i></p>		
FROM: <i>A/DCI</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
<p>FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55</p> <p>REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.</p>		

26 OCT 1955 STATINTL

(47)

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE *Pub Affs*

		Executive Registry	
		76-10384	
TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 10/28	
TO: Andrew Falkiewicz			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		
REMARKS:  F.Y.I			
STATINTL			
FROM: [REDACTED] FA/OT			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION	

FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-B  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

DCI PUBLIC APPEARANCE

Event: David R. Deaner Memorial Lecture Series

Place: Dixon Hall, Tulane

Date: November 15, 1976

Time: 7:30-9:00 p.m.

Speaking from Text

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No x

Need Press Office Help  
to Prepare Text

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No x

Hand Out Text \_\_\_\_\_

Limited Release \_\_\_\_\_

Embargoed Release \_\_\_\_\_

Want Press Office to Attend

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No x

Press Conference

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No x

Need Press Office Help  
to Set Up Press Conference

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No x

Special Press Assistance Required

Comments

30 minute speech followed by 30 Q&A from panel of 3 teachers.  
(One is a General International Relations specialist; another  
will be a S.E. Asia specialist and the third will be the  
moderator) This session will be followed by 15-20 minute  
student Q&A session

Travel Arrangements

Neil will introduce you.

Contact Neil Bush -- [REDACTED]

call him on Mon, Wed, or Fri at 11:30 a.m.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

*Pub Affs*

STATOT


STATOT



SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM					
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
<b>OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS		
1	DCI				
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ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
<b>Remarks:</b>  <p>I have seen attached note. If I can be of help, please let me know.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Andrew T. Falkiewicz 26 October 1976</p>					
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER					
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.					DATE
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10-26

Mr. George Bush



I'm [REDACTED]

SON-IN-LAW — married to [REDACTED]

STATINTL

STATINTL

We're Being Reassigned  
To Moscow By UPI & I  
was in your Building  
Taking some BRIEFINGS.

Had hoped to have a  
cup of COFFEE with you.  
Here until Thursday  
At Hotel Washington Rm. 1011.  
Regards

STATOTHR

[REDACTED]  
Paul Afford

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Executive Registry

96-10383

FROM THE DESK OF  
THE DIRECTOR

Jennifer-pls.read then pass to ATF

STATINTL

ATF :

[REDACTED] has volunteered to speak for  
the CIA when we are invited to speak  
and can't fill the bill.

Let's discuss this. There are tons of  
invites that we can't handle and it might  
make good sense to have a luist of people, knowled  
able on CIA, who can go forth to speak....

Please discusss... no rush

GB 10-23

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE *Per Affs*

STATINTL

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 20 Oct 76
TO: Mr. Andrew Falkiewicz		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
FROM: DCI		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

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(47)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

FROM THE DESK OF  
THE DIRECTOR

Executive Registry

76-3747

ATF:

We ought to see that this gets some distribution on the Hill to our committees.....  
elsewhere too if possible.  
I'll be interested to see if Post or Times  
use this.... please advise.

GB 10-20

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

*Pub. Affairs*

REF 10-20

A I

PM-COMMENT ADV20 10-19

ADV FOR PMS WED OCT 20  
(650)

FOREIGN NEWS COMMENTARY:

SOVIET PRESS HAS A FIELD DAY WITH THE CIA  
BY HOWARD A. TYNER

MOSCOW (UPI) -- THE CHIEF SPORT IN THE SOVIET PRESS THESE DAYS IS NOT SOCCER OR ICE HOCKEY, BUT HANGING OUT THE DIRTY LINEN OF THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

HARDLY A DAY GOES BY WITHOUT SOME NEWSPAPER OR MAGAZINE, AND OFTEN RADIO AND TELEVISION, TOO, CARRYING NEW ALLEGATIONS ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SO-CALLED "MONSTER OF LANGLEY."

"CIA CONNECTIONS WITH MAFIA," TASS NEWS AGENCY SAID IN A TYPICAL HEADLINE. "CIA SHADOW OVER INDIA," THE WEEKLY NOVOE VREMYA SAID IN ANOTHER. IF IT ISN'T EXPERIMENTATION WITH LSD, THEN IT'S THE UNDERMINING OF SOME AFRICAN COUNTRY, OR HELPING ISRAEL WITH ITS "CRIMINAL" RAID LAST JULY TO FREE HIJACK HOSTAGES AT ENTEBBE AIRPORT IN UGANDA.

NEVER IS THERE MENTION OF THE CIA'S ARCH-RIVAL, THE SOVIET KGB.

MOST STORIES ARE LITTLE MORE THAN EMBELLISHED VERSIONS OF FACT--OR RUMOR--PUBLISHED ELSEWHERE. A POPULAR TECHNIQUE IS TO ATTRIBUTE ACCUSATIONS CONCERNING THE AGENCY TO "PRESS REPORTS," BUT NOT SAY WHERE THOSE REPORTS APPEARED.

THUS TASS, QUOTING THESE ANONYMOUS "PRESS REPORTS," SUGGESTED THAT CIA AND PENTAGON EXPERIMENTS ON BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MAY HAVE BACKFIRED, CAUSING THE "LEGIONNAIRES DISEASE" THAT KILLED NEARLY 30 U.S. VETERANS WHO ATTENDED A CONFERENCE IN PHILADELPHIA IN JULY.

OTHER MATERIAL IS ORIGINAL--SUCH AS THE CLAIM BY THE WEEKLY LITERATURNAYA GAZETA THAT THREE MOSCOW-BASED AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS WORKED FOR THE CIA.

WESTERN DIPLOMATS SAY THEY CAN'T RECALL WHEN THE INTENSITY OF ANTI-CIA PROPAGANDA HERE REACHED SUCH A PEAK AS IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS.

DCI

JUST AS RECRUITMENT FOR  
CIA IS UP IN US after all  
the publicity-- the same  
REACTION MAY OCCUR AMONG  
SOME SOVIET CITIZENS.

THE SOVIET UNION IS ALWAYS READY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT. DIPLOMATS SAY THE CURRENT BARRAGE IS MOST LIKELY AN ATTEMPT TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF WIDESPREAD DOMESTIC AMERICAN CRITICISM OF THE CIA FOLLOWING DISCLOSURES ABOUT SOME OF ITS CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES.

BUT THE GENERAL CHILLING OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE PAST YEAR ALSO PROBABLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE KREMLIN DECISION TO LAUNCH THE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN, ACCORDING TO THE DIPLOMATS.

AN EXAMPLE OF THE TYPE OF STORY THAT HAS BEEN APPEARING WAS A RECENT TWO-PART REPORT ON MOSCOW TELEVISION CALLED "THE CIA'S SECRET WAR."

PRESENTED AS A DOCUMENTARY, THE PROGRAM INCLUDED LONG-RANGE MOTION PICTURES OF CIA HEADQUARTERS AT LANGLEY, VA., AND OLD NEWSREEL FOOTAGE LINKED TO THE HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION.

THE COMMENTATOR NOTED, "IT IS NO LONGER A SECRET TO ANYONE THAT THE CIA IS ENGAGED IN WIDESPREAD ESPIONAGE AND MAKES WIDE USE OF AMERICAN JOURNALISTS, BUSINESSMEN AND EVEN TOURISTS."

THE CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE CIA IS "A WILD ANIMAL DANGEROUS BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES."

THE GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER IZVESTIA POOH-POOHED THE ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION SET UP BY PRESIDENT FORD TO INVESTIGATE CIA ACTIVITIES. THE COMMISSION, ACCORDING TO IZVESTIA, "DID NOT DARE" TO SAY ANYTHING TOO BAD ABOUT THE CIA BECAUSE THE INVESTIGATORS THEMSELVES--LIKE THE CIA--WERE TOO CLOSE TO AMERICA'S "MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX."

A FAVORITE TARGET OF SOVIET PRESS RIDICULE ARE THE AMERICAN FINANCED, MUNICH-BASED RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY, WHICH BROADCAST TO THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE.

ONCE FUNDED BY THE CIA, THE STATIONS NOW RECEIVE THEIR FINANCING DIRECTLY FROM THE U.S. CONGRESS. YET DOZENS OF CURRENT ARTICLES HERE LINK THE STATIONS WITH THE CIA, EVEN TO THE EXTENT OF ACCUSING LORD CHALFONT--BRITAIN'S FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER AND UNITED NATIONS AMBASSADOR--OF BEING AN "INTERCESSOR" FOR THE AGENCY BECAUSE HE PRAISED THE WORK OF RADIO LIBERTY AND RADIO FREE EUROPE.

BUT THE CIA MAY NOT BE THE SOVIET MEDIA'S NO. 1 ANTIHERO FOR LONG. RECENT ARTICLES HAVE INCLUDED SUCH ITEMS AS "CROOKED MEN FROM THE FBI" AND "NEW DISCLOSURES OF FBI ACTIVITIES," MEANING THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION MAY BE IN FOR THE SAME SORT OF TREATMENT.

ADV FOR AMS WED OCT 20

UPI 10-19 06:17 RED



Executive Registry

76.5427/A

October 19, 1976

Dear Jack,

The answer, of course, is yes.

I don't know what the heck I could say about "The American Presidency in Transition" which would be of any interest whatsoever to your class at American University. But on the proviso that they promise not to throw anything at me, I will be glad to be there. Let's get in touch right after the first of the year.

Warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

George Bush

Mr. Jack Valenti  
President  
Motion Picture Association  
of America, Inc.  
1600 Eye Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20006

DCI/GB/mjl  
Distribution:  
Orig - Addressee

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THE Public Affairs

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# EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

## Routing Slip

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2	DDCI				
3	D/DCI/IC				
4	DDS&T				
5	DDI				
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9	GC				
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11	IG				
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14	D/S				
15	DTR				
16	Asst/DCI		✓		
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPS				
19	DCI/SS				
20	EA/DCI	✓			
21					
22					

SUSPENSE	Date
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Remarks:

Executive Secretary

Date



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1600 EYE STREET, NORTHWEST  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

Executive Register

76-5727

JACK VALENTI  
PRESIDENT

October 8, 1976

*Dictate*

*My dear George*

I come to you with a request which, Lord knows, collides with your very busy schedule. But I am speculating that you would respond to this as I would if you were to direct it to me.

I am embarking on a new enterprise beginning in January. I will be teaching a course -- THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY IN TRANSITION -- for master's degree graduate students in political science at American University in Washington.

I would be so very grateful if you would give me one evening of your life to come before this class and discuss with them your own brand of expertise on this subject. I don't have to tell you that these students would count your appearance a highlight.

The class begins at 8:10 pm and ends at 10:40 pm, each Monday. The first class is scheduled for January 17, 1977, and the last class is April 25. If you would come one evening, we would work out a date suitable to your schedule.

Would you be agreeable to being with me and these students one evening?

I would consider your appearance a "marker" on me. You can collect on it any time you want.


May I hear from you, and I hope, favorably?

Sincerely,

The Honorable George Bush  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

*Jan*

ALWAYS USE  
ZIP CODE



The Honorable George Bush  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC.  
1600 EYE STREET, NORTHWEST  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

Executive Registry

26-5005/1

October 19, 1976

Dear Mr. Kagan,

A while back you wrote me about the possibility of my being a Chubb Fellow at Yale. I told you that I was not able to do it this fall, but if rain checks were in order I would be glad to consider it for a later date.

I have a suggestion that might conceivably be of interest to you. Recently Admiral Noel Gayler retired as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. He is a very articulate Naval officer who has had enormously important jobs. CINCPAC, of course, is one of the very top four star Navy jobs. Prior to that Admiral Gayler was in charge of the National Security Agency, a very important component of our Intelligence Community.

Admiral Gayler retired last month, and should you be looking for someone with his wide variety of talents I think he would be interested in coming to Yale. He is attractive and communicates well with children. He is not a hard-line, doctrinaire kind of guy although he certainly is a proponent of strong defense.

Having been a Chubb Fellow and appreciating what it is all about, I can recommend Admiral Gayler to you for your consideration should you still have some openings and should a Naval officer fill the bill.

His address is: Admiral Noel Gayler,

Please don't bother to acknowledge this. Simply contact Admiral Gayler if he is of interest to you.

Yours very truly,

/s/ George Bush

George Bush

Mr. Donald Kagan  
Master  
Chubb Fellowship  
Timothy Dwight College  
Yale University  
New Haven, Connecticut 06520

DCI/GB/mjl

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1 - DCI 1 - ER

*Public Affairs*

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

STATINTL

The panelists were Mike Malanick, Ted Shackley,  
"Zeke" Zellmer, and [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] in Andrew

Falkiewicz' office. A buckslip is attached expressing  
your thanks for a job well done.

STATINTL

[REDACTED]  
D/ES

13 Oct 76

Date

DCI/DDCI

Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO.			ACTION	INFO.
1	DCI			11	LC		
2	DDCI		X	12	IG		
3	S/MC			13	Compt		
4	DDS&T		X	14	Asst/DCI		X
5	DDI		X	15	AO/DCI		
6	DD <del>AS</del>		X	16	Ex/Sec		
7	DDO		X	17	D/OCI		X
8	D/DCI/IC			18			
9	D/DCI/NIO			19			
10	GC			20			

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

My thanks to all for a job well done!

DCI/DDCI

14 OCT 1976

*Rob. G. G.*

76-2523/5



## AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION

1750 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 452-7300

An Independent Non Profit Aerospace Organization

GEORGE M. DOUGLAS

*President*

October 8, 1976

Dear Mr. Bush:

On behalf of the officers and members of the Air Force Association, I extend our deep thanks to you and to the Agency for arranging the briefing for our national convention delegates last month.

Seldom have we received such praise for a single program. This obviously reflects the high caliber of the briefers and is an acknowledgment of the forthright and candid presentation which our delegates received.

I want to especially thank Mr. E. Henry Knoche for his introductory remarks, Mr. Paul Walsh, who did a wonderful job as Panel Moderator, the four panelists, and [REDACTED] who was most efficient in working out administrative details with our staff.

Thank you again for allowing us to share in this most informative and worthwhile program.

Sincerely,

The Honorable George Bush  
Director of Central Intelligence  
CIA  
Washington, DC 20505

kcc



**CONFIDENTIAL**

Public Affairs

Executive Registry

76-252344

DDCI Public Appearance

23 Aug 76

Event: Air Force Association 30th Annual National Convention

Place: Washington, D.C. CIA Headquarters

Date: 22 September 1976

Time:

Speaking from Text

Yes ☒No ☐Need Press Office Help  
to Prepare TextYes ☒No ☐Hand Out Text ☐Limited Release ☐Embargoed Release ☐{ whatever  
AF  
advises

Want Press Office to Attend

Yes ☒No ☐

Press Conference

Yes ☐No ☐

Either way

Need Press Office Help  
to Set Up Press ConferenceYes ☐No ☐

Special Press Assistance Required

Comments

Let's get a good text  
describing the new look in intelligence  
and the role we play in  
advancing for pol. formulation.

Travel Arrangements

Pub Affs

Security to Accompany

Yes ☐No ☐

STATINTL